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Abstract
In this article, the role of abductive reasoning within Peirce’s diagrammatic 
reasoning is discussed. Both abduction and diagrammatic reasoning bring in 
elements of discovery but it is not clear if abduction should be a part of a fully 
developed diagrammatic system or not for Peirce. This relates to Peirce’s way 
of interpreting abduction in his later writings. Iconicity and perceptual ele-
ments as a basis for discoveries are analyzed, both in deductive and abductive 
reasoning. At the end, the role of modern ideas of distributed cognition applied 
to the Peircean scheme is shortly delineated.
Keywords: diagrams; abduction; deduction; iconicity; discovery; distrib-
uted cognition
From the Peircean point of view, diagrams should be the heart of all reasoning. 
They are central in trying to understand the creative character of reasoning, 
especially because they are iconic signs. From early on, Peirce held that the 
iconic and observational character of all reasoning explained how deductive 
reasoning can draw necessary conclusions and, at the same time, present sur-
prising discoveries (see below). According to Peirce, all necessary reasoning is 
diagrammatic (e.g., EP 2: 206, 212, 1903), and “diagrammatic reasoning is the 
only really fertile reasoning” (CP 4.571, 1906).
Diagrams, however, present a problem when it comes to Peirce’s conception 
of the third mode of reasoning, i.e., abduction. Mathematical or necessary, that 
is, diagrammatic reasoning is the basis for all reasoning but does it include 
abduction? In reading Peirce’s passages of this topic, it often seems that abduc-
tion (and, similarly, induction) is not a part of diagrammatic reasoning. And the 
same holds for modern commentators on Peirce’s diagrammatic reasoning; 
usually they do not mention abduction at all or only in passing (Zeman 1964; 
Roberts 1973: 98–99, 127; Shin 1994; Allwein and Barwise 1996; Johnson-
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Laird 2002). Is it even possible that abduction could be a part of diagrammatic 
systems (see Müller 1998: 92, 96)? Yet the exclusion from diagrammatic char-
acter is a bit strange if abduction is taken (as Peirce certainly did) as a third 
main mode of reasoning. And abduction is according to Peirce even more 
closely related to iconicity than deduction (CP 2.96, c. 1902, 1997: 276, 1903). 
Abduction is also supposed to be the way how “all the ideas of science come” 
(EP 2: 205, 1903). Is abduction then also a part of diagrammatic reasoning 
when it comes to surprising discoveries? How is “fertility” of reasoning re-
lated, on the one hand to diagrams, and on the other hand to abduction?
My aim in this paper is to suggest tentative solutions to these intricate ques-
tions. I am focusing on a Peircean claim that diagrammatic and iconic elements 
are a basis for creative aspects of human cognition in general, not so much 
concentrating on Peirce’s diagrammatic systems of logic as such (although I 
make some references to his existential graphs also; cf. Stjernfelt 2000; Hoff-
mann 2011). First, I briefly present the role of diagrams and iconicity as a ba-
sis for fertility within reasoning. Second, I explain some ways of understand-
ing the relationship between abduction and diagrammatic reasoning. Third, I 
analyze the role of iconicity as a basis for abduction. Finally, I delineate the 
importance of distributed cognition for understanding abductive processes of 
discovery.
1.	 The	nature	of	diagrammatic	reasoning	and	iconicity
Before developing his system of existential graphs, Peirce already emphasized 
the diagrammatic character of all reasoning. Even simple syllogisms and for-
mulas of algebra have their basis in constructing a diagram (an icon) and mak-
ing observations and experiments upon this diagram. This iconic and observa-
tional character of deduction explains, according to Peirce, how deductive, 
necessary reasoning can also provide surprising discoveries.
It has long been a puzzle how it could be that, on the one hand, mathematics is purely 
deductive in its nature, and draws its conclusions apodictically, while on the other hand, 
it presents as rich and apparently unending a series of surprising discoveries as any 
observational science. Various have been the attempts to solve the paradox by breaking 
down one or other of these assertions, but without success. The truth, however, appears 
to be that all deductive reasoning, even simple syllogism, involves an element of obser-
vation; namely, deduction consists in constructing an icon or diagram the relations of 
whose parts shall present a complete analogy with those of the parts of the object of 
reasoning, of experimenting upon this image in the imagination, and of observing the 
result so as to discover unnoticed and hidden relations among the parts. (EP 1: 227, 
1885)
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Syllogisms and reasoning in general are about making diagrams and observa-
tions on the basis of these diagrams: “. . . in all reasoning there must be some-
thing amounting to a diagram before the mind’s eye, and that the act of infer-
ence consists in observing a relation between parts of that diagram that had not 
entered into the design of its construction” (NEM 4: 353, 893; NEM 4: 275–
276, c. 1895)
Peirce’s basic definition of diagrams was that they are iconic signs concern-
ing intelligible relations (in contrast to images which represent simple qualities 
and metaphors which concern representative character of signs; CP 2.277, c. 
1902; see also NEM 4: 316, c. 1906). Diagrams do not necessarily resemble 
their objects in looks, but only in respect to the relations of their parts (EP 2: 
13, 1895). Diagrams represent relations in between their own parts that are 
supposed to be analogous, i.e., similar to relations of parts within things repre-
sented (see W 5: 243, 1885).
This kind of a basic definition is a good starting point for understanding 
Peircean diagrams although some qualifications must be given also in relation 
to Peirce’s theory of signs. First, Peirce characterized icons at various times 
as if their fundamental characteristic is a (mere) similarity, or resemblance 
between the sign and its object (e.g., EP 1: 226, 1885; EP 1: 7, 1868; EP 2: 
460 – 461, 1909). Similarity is a notoriously difficult concept in philosophy, 
and this has led to criticisms concerning this kind of an iconicity in many 
 areas of research (see Stjernfelt 2000; Eco 2000). But similarity, upon deeper 
analysis, was not the most fundamental characteristic of icons for Peirce. Icons 
are signs that refer to their objects merely with characters of their own even if 
there are no objects with similar characters. So, in some sense, their starting 
point is just these signs in themselves, and similarity relations to objects is 
secondary.
An Icon is a sign which refers to the Object that it denotes merely by virtue of characters 
of its own and which it possesses, just the same, whether any such Object actually exists 
or not. It is true that unless there really is such an Object, the Icon does not act [as] a 
sign; but this has nothing to do with its character as a sign. Anything whatever, be it 
quality, existent individual, or law, is an icon of anything, in so far as it is like that thing 
and used as a sign of it. (EP 2: 291, 1903; see also CP 8.335, 1904; EP 2: 163, 1903; 
CP 4.447, c. 1903)
This “self-sufficient” character of icons and diagrams makes them fit well for 
reasoning.
A diagram, indeed, so far as it has a general signification, is not a pure icon; but in the 
middle part of our reasonings we forget that abstractness in great measure, and the dia-
gram is for us the very thing. So in contemplating a painting, there is a moment when 
we lose the consciousness that it is not the thing, the distinction of the real and the copy 
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disappears, and it is for the moment a pure dream — not any particular existence, and 
yet not general. At that moment we are contemplating an icon. (EP 1: 226, 1885)
And they are a basis for new discoveries: “. . . a great distinguishing property 
of the icon is that by the direct observation of it other truths concerning its 
object can be discovered than those which suffice to determine its construc-
tion” (CP 2.279, c. 1895).
On the other hand, pure icons are fictitious, or ideal typical in nature; signs 
can actually be more or less iconic. Peirce maintained that a pure icon would 
be a possibility alone with just qualities (and Firstness by Peirce’s categories) 
in contrast to “hypoicons,” which are mainly iconic (EP 2: 273, 1903; see also 
EP 2: 163, 1903). Also in relation to diagrams, although Peirce emphasized 
their iconic character, he also pointed out that they are of a mixed character, 
having also symbolic and indexical elements; a diagram is “. . . predominantly 
an icon of relations and is aided to be so by conventions. Indices are also more 
or less used” (CP 4.418, c. 1903, emphasis added; also CP 4.531, 1906; MS 
293). Diagrammatic icons operate in connection with symbolic interpretants in 
logic (MS 293, c. 1906) So, it seems right to say that the interplay with several 
kinds of signs and with different kinds of elements within reasoning was cen-
tral for Peirce, not just their iconic, indexical, or symbolic character (see EP 1: 
226 –228, 1885; EP 2: 10, 1894; EP 2: 441– 442, 1908; cf. Barwise and 
Etchemendy 1996: 179–200).
2.	 The	relationship	between	diagrams	and	abduction
Peirce emphasized that reasoning in general is diagrammatic, but does this 
mean all deductive reasoning, or induction and abduction as well? Abduction 
has characteristics closely connected to diagrammatic reasoning; iconic sign 
relationships are central in abduction, and abduction is closely connected to 
perceptual qualities, which explains why it is supposed to be an “originative” 
form of reasoning, that is, a way of introducing new ideas (EP 2: 226 –241, 
1903; Hanson 1958). But still it is not at all clear what, according to Peirce, is 
the relationship between abduction and diagrammatic reasoning.
Peirce never made any system on the basis of abduction. In his later writ-
ings, he presented abduction with a basic formula having a syllogistic form 
(see EP 2: 231, 1903):
The surprising fact, C, is observed;
But if A were true, C would be a matter of course.
Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true.
On the other hand, abduction comes close to pure guessing (e.g., CP 7.219, 
1901), or spontaneous conjectures (EP 2: 443, 1908). In his famous paper Ne-
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glected Argument for the Reality of God (1908) he presented abduction (then 
named “retroduction”) as a form of “argument” rather than “argumentation” 
(EP 2: 441, 1908), meaning by argument “any process of thought reasonably 
tending to produce a definite belief ” and by an argumentation “an [a]rgument 
proceeding upon definitely formulated premisses” (EP 2: 435, 1908). Within 
these formulations, abduction was aided by il lume naturale, i.e., a “light of 
reason” according to which human beings have a tendency to find true theories 
(CP 1.80 –1.81, c. 1896). This tendency was not, Peirce thought, infallible but 
strong enough to help human beings to find fertile hypotheses better than by 
pure chance.
I think that these kinds of formulations by (later) Peirce made it more under-
standable why he did not include abduction with diagrammatic reasoning. 
Usually when Peirce described diagrammatic reasoning it was about deductive 
reasoning. He sometimes even explicitly wrote that induction and abduction 
are not diagrammatic reasoning — other than in an indirect way. Induction: 
“instead of experimenting on Diagrams . . . experiments upon the very Objects 
concerning which it reasons” (MS 293, c. 1906), whereas abduction is “. . . 
guessing . . . Such validity as this has consists in the generalization that no new 
truth is ever otherwise reached while some new truths are thus reached. This is 
a result of Induction; and therefore in a remote way Abduction rests upon dia-
grammatic reasoning” (MS 293, c. 1906).
Abduction, in the passages just cited, would then belong to pre-diagrammatic 
phases of the process of reasoning (see also Stjernfelt 2000: 372–373). Dia-
grams require “a perfectly consistent system of representation” (CP 4.418, 
c. 1903), whereas abduction for Peirce was more “open,” a way of suggesting 
good guesses.
On the other hand, there are some statements by Peirce that suggest he 
would have wanted to include abduction to diagrammatic reasoning:
. . . the limitation of the Graphs to the representation of necessary reasonings, which 
was imposed upon them in my “Prolegomena” [Prolegomena to an Apology for Prag-
maticism, 1906], was needless: they are equally capable of representing the creations of 
explanatory conjectures, as well as the whole process of induction. (MS 296, c. 1907–
1908; see also MS 296)
It seems then that Peirce’s aim of developing existential graphs further, and 
especially the gamma (or delta) part, meant that he wanted, at least in some of 
his formulations, to include abduction and induction in them. He did not man-
age to finish the gamma part, but it was supposed to include modalities that 
clearly presented a problem for the diagrammatic system according to Peirce 
(see MS 298, 1905). Modalities are important also from the point of view of 
abduction because with modalities he postulated a difference between deduc-
tion, induction, and abduction:
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By Deduction one infers that if certain premisses are exactly true, then a certain conclu-
sion must be true, either always or once in a certain proportion of cases in the long run. 
By Adduction [i.e., Induction] one infers that a certain state of things is true, at least 
approximately. By the third class of reasonings one only infers that a certain state of 
things may be true and that the indications of its being so are sufficient to warrant fur-
ther examination. (MS 764; cf. EP 2: 216, 1903)
To successfully make graphs a “moving picture of thought” (see MS 298) 
seemed to require that abduction and induction should be included. But usually 
Peirce hesitated in drawing this conclusion (unless the inclusion is understood 
in an indirect way), stating that:
It may, however, be urged, that the Graphs only exhibit the processes of necessary 
 ratiocination, but neither what passes in thought when from the contemplation of a be-
wildering mob of facts to an idea which might reduce them to order [i.e., abduction 
(SP)], nor yet that reverse operation by which, setting out from an idea, we make use of 
experiments to correct it and to confirm it [i.e., induction (SP)]. If this be made the 
ground of objection, the reply will be that although the rules which I have attached to 
the system of graphs only contemplate necessary reasoning, yet the other modes of 
 inference are so related to the necessary mode that they are virtually given in the pre-
sentation of that. (MS 298, 1905)
In his later formulations of reasoning, abduction and induction were phases in 
a “methodeutical” process (a methodological perspective), not just syllogistic 
forms of reasoning. With abduction a hypothesis is suggested concerning 
 reality, which is made clear with deduction and tested with induction (CP 
6.469– 6.473, 1908; CP 7.202–7.219, 1901; see also, e.g., Paavola 2006b). Ab-
duction and induction concern real things whereas deduction relates to ideal 
states of things: “. . . Abduction furnishes all our ideas concerning real things, 
beyond what are given in perception, but is mere conjecture, without probative 
force. Deduction is certain but relates only to ideal objects. Induction gives us 
the only approach to certainty concerning the real that we can have” (CP 8.209, 
c. 1905)
Abduction concerned mysteries surrounding the question of how human 
 beings are and have been able to make conjectures about the world so suc-
cessfully (CP 5.591, 1903; EP 2: 217, 1903).
Deduction proceeds by constructing a diagram representing purely ideal or 
hypothetical states of things, making observations about relations involved 
that suggest a hypothesis, and, on the basis of the hypothesis, making experi-
ments (CP 2.778, 1901). There are stages in this process that seem to resemble 
abduction and induction, respectively; first, when on the basis of observations 
“a hypothesis suggests itself,” and, second, when the hypothesis is tested with 
experiments. But about the latter resemblance, Peirce comments explicitly: 
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“This is a proceeding extremely similar to induction, from which, however, it 
differs widely, in that it does not deal with a course of experience, but with 
whether or not a certain state of things can be imagined” (CP 2.778, 1901). So 
it seems that at least according to these kinds of formulations, within diagram-
matic, deductive reasoning there are phases reminiscent of abduction and in-
duction. Abduction and induction as such are not a part of diagrammatic rea-
soning but rather abduction precedes, and induction comes after diagrammatic 
reasoning. According to this line of thought, diagrams are involved in hypo-
thetical and necessary mathematical universe, and abduction and induction are 
involved when things about our experience or reality are at the focus.
One way of interpreting abduction in connection to diagrammatic reason-
ing is then to see abduction from the point of view of deductive (necessary, 
diagrammatic) reasoning (Hoffmann 1999; see also Hintikka 1998). These 
 elements close to abduction within deduction are connected especially to 
 “theorematic reasoning.” Peirce made a distinction between corollarial and 
theorematic reasoning:
Corollarial deduction is where it is only necessary to imagine any case in which the 
premisses are true in order to perceive immediately that the conclusion holds in that 
case. All ordinary syllogisms and some deductions in the logic of relatives belong to 
this class. Theorematic deduction is deduction in which it is necessary to experiment 
in the imagination upon the image of the premiss in order from the result of such ex-
periment to make corollarial deductions to the truth of the conclusion. (NEM 4: 38, 
1902)
Theorematic reasoning is central for the “fertility” of deductive reasoning: 
“The peculiarity of theorematic reasoning is that it considers something not 
implied at all in the conceptions so far gained, which neither the definition of 
the object of research nor anything yet known about could of themselves sug-
gest, although they give room for it” (NEM 4: 49, 1902)
On the basis of this connection, Michael Hoffmann has suggested that 
“[w]hat theorematic deduction is for mathematics, abduction seems to be for 
scientific discoveries in general” (1999: 292). Peirce himself did not usually 
make this connection between theorematic reasoning and abduction. Hoff-
mann has found just one place where there is a clear remark of this connection 
by Peirce:
But further study leads me to lop off a corollarial part from the Theorematic Deduc-
tions, which follows that part that originates a new point of view. This part of the theo-
rematic procedure, I will call theôric reasoning. It is very plainly allied to retroduction 
[i.e., abduction (SP)], from which it only differs as far as I now see in being indisput-
able. (Peirce quoted in Hoffmann 1999: 293)
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I agree with Hoffmann that there seem to be clear similarities between abduc-
tion and phases of theorematic reasoning. It is important, however, to note that 
even if there are some similarities, the forms of reasoning are still fundamen-
tally different according to Peirce (theôric reasoning is “indisputable”). Deduc-
tion, even theorematic deduction, is about necessary, or apodictic reasoning, 
while abduction is supposed to be a weaker form of reasoning, coming close to 
guessing (Hoffmann 1999: 293–294). So, there is a need to understand the role 
of theorematic reasoning and abduction separately in relation to diagrammatic 
reasoning.
3.	 Abduction	and	iconicity
Peirce emphasized the iconicity of all reasoning (e.g., NEM 4: 353, 1893; NEM 
4: 275, c. 1895; NEM 4: 158, 1903). The basis for this claim was that, accord-
ing to Peirce, truths of reasoning are perceived in some important sense. Rea-
soning makes its conclusions evident, and this requires essentially iconic signs 
(MS 293, c. 1906). “It is . . . a very extraordinary feature of Diagrams that they 
show — as literally show as a Percept shows the Perceptual Judgment to be 
true — that a consequence does follow, and more marvelous yet, that it would 
follow under all varieties of circumstances accompanying the premises” (MS 
293, c. 1906)
The observational character of reasoning is important also in bringing the 
element of discovery to reasoning (EP 1: 227, 1885).
The iconic character of reasoning is even more prominent in abduction. Ab-
duction is inference “through an Icon” in contrast to induction and deduction, 
which are inferences, respectively, “through an Index” and “through a Sym-
bol” (Peirce 1997: 276, 1903; see also CP 1.559, 1867). Abduction is closely 
related to perceptual judgments (EP 2: 226 –241, 1903; Hanson 1958; Hoff-
mann 1999), it “shades into perceptual judgment without any sharp line of 
demarcation” (EP 2: 227, 1903).
It is, however, not clear how to interpret the relationship between iconicity, 
abduction, and perceptual judgments. In what sense is abduction supposed to 
be iconic and close to perception in contrast to indexicality of induction, and 
symbolicity of deduction (although it is not clear if induction is, according to 
Peirce, symbolic and deduction indexical — see Peirce 1997: 276 –277, 1903; 
EP 2: 205–206, 1903)? I maintain that one central basis for this relationship is 
that abduction, iconic signs, and perceptual judgments all use clue-like signs as 
their starting point (Paavola 2005: 148). These clue-like characteristics mean 
that they are signs that only suggest a way (or ways) of interpreting them, or 
seeing a unifying connection between these clues. In abduction it means that 
a potentially promising way of arranging a previously confusing constellation 
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of things or characteristics is found or derived on the basis of these character-
istics and background knowledge (Peirce 1997: 282–283, 1903; EP 2: 287, 
1903).
At the first sight, perception and perceptual judgments seem to be a total 
opposite to this process. Percepts and also perceptual judgments force them-
selves on the perceiver; they are something that cannot be controlled by the 
person making them (EP 2: 155, 191, 1903). If something is perceived, it can-
not be changed by the will. But, at the same time, perceptual judgments involve 
interpretation, which brings them close to abduction (EP 2: 299, 1903). This 
abductive or interpretative character of perception is evident in reversible fig-
ures (like the Necker Cube) where the same visual data can be interpreted in 
various ways (see EP 2: 228, 1903; see also Hanson 1958). Perception can be 
analyzed with a formula that is similar to abduction:
A well-recognized kind of object, M, has for its ordinary predicates P[1], P[2], P[3], 
etc., indistinctly recognized.
The suggesting object, S, has these same predicates, P[1], P[2], P[3], etc.
Hence, S is of the kind M. (CP 8.64, 1891)
This sequence is abductive in form, but “[i]n perception, the conclusion has the 
peculiarity of not being abstractly thought, but actually seen, so that it is not 
exactly a judgment, though it is tantamount to one” (CP 8.65, 1891).
This brings us to iconicity in abduction. Abduction is an “originary” form 
of reasoning (CP 2.96, c. 1902), it should “cover all the operations by which 
theories and conceptions are engendered” (CP 5.590, 1903). Icons are cen-
tral in abduction because icon is a sign that “denotes merely by virtue of 
 characters of its own” (EP 2: 291, 1903 — see above). Icon is “an Origina-
lian Sign . . . which is a Sign whose significant virtue is due simply to its Qual-
ity” (CP 2.92, 1902). In its pure form, icon is a mere possibility (EP 2: 277, 
1903). “Icons . . . merely suggest the possibility of that which they represent, 
being, percepts minus the insistency and percussivity of percepts” (MS 293, 
c. 1906).
In short, icons, perceptual judgments, and abduction are different in impor-
tant respects, because icons are, in their “pure” form, only pure possibilities, 
whereas perceptual judgments have their basis in the “insistency” of percepts, 
and abduction is a form of reasoning with consciously generated conclusions 
(at least in basic modes of reasoning). Still, there are important similarities 
between them. In all of them some characteristics or phenomena suggest a 
potential way of interpreting or explaining these characteristics or phenomena 
and bringing them into some kind of an order.
I think that a good starting point for understanding the relationship between 
abduction and iconicity is from 1901: “The mode of suggestion by which, in 
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abduction, the facts suggest the hypothesis is by resemblance — the resem-
blance of the facts to the consequences of the hypothesis.” (CP 7.218) I have 
depicted this in a simple diagram (figure 1):
So, according to this formula, an important iconic relationship within abduc-
tive inference is between some facts or phenomena stated (P1) and the conse-
quences (P2) of a hypothesis suggested (H1). The abductive conclusion is that 
this kind of a hypothesis (H1) may be true (in relationship to those facts [P1]). 
A good example of this kind of abduction is provided by a case often referred 
in philosophy of science, that is, Ignaz Semmelweis’ solution about the cause 
of the childbed fever (see more thoroughly Paavola 2006a). Semmelweis’ cru-
cial hypothesis (in his long search for the cause of this lethal decease) came 
when he noticed that the symptoms caused by blood poisoning are similar to 
symptoms of the childbed fever, and he made a hypothesis on the basis of this 
(which he then tested and modified); see figure 2:
The abductive formula above (figure 1) could be presented differently so that 
it would emphasize the iconic character somewhat more1 (figure 3):
Figure 1. A basic formula of abduction with an iconic relationship
Figure 2. An argument for Semmelweis’ crucial hypothesis
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So there is iconicity in two places here. I would like to emphasize a processual 
(or a “methodeutical,” in Peircean terms) approach as a way of analyzing the 
abductive search for hypotheses with clue-like signs. Semmelweis’ case can be 
taken as an example. A basic formula of abduction is often presented as if the 
surprising phenomenon is only a single fact (e.g., EP 2: 231, 1903) but a better 
picture is provided by emphasizing a constellation of facts or characteristics. 
Various features which were somehow problematic and without explanation 
were a starting point for the search for new hypotheses for Semmelweis; at the 
case of the crucial hypothesis symptoms of the childbed fever and the recogni-
tion that they are similar to symptoms in cases of the blood poisoning. This 
recognition was not a matter of course because these symptoms are quite com-
plicated; lymphangitis, phlebitis, bilateral pleurisy, pericarditis, peritonitis, and 
meningitis, and they were not, of course, exactly alike with all patients. This is 
emphasized in the figure above by using different fonts (figure 3); Semmelweis 
could not count on conventional ways of interpreting the relationship between 
these two cases (that is, on “symbolic” similarity) because the conventional 
way of interpreting these symptoms was to see no connection between these 
two cases (the connection between childbed fever and blood poisoning was not 
recognized). By recognizing this similarity, Semmelweis used an iconic rela-
tionship, and concluded that there are good reasons to think that the cause 
might be similar in these two cases.
In order to understand the nature of abductive reasoning better, it is impor-
tant to notice that the symptoms were not the only basis for Semmelweis to 
draw his conclusion. He knew many (other) curious and problematic things 
about childbed fever which guided his search for new hypotheses about its 
cause (he had tried many other explanations already before this “crucial” hy-
pothesis). So I maintain that Semmelweis’ reasoning can be presented as above 
in the figure 2 but actually there were additional reasons for it which make it 
also understandable why Semmelweis noticed the connection between child-
bed fever and blood poisoning, while others did not. The reason was that Sem-
melweis had for long searched the cause of childbed fever, and this previous 
information constrained and guided his search. He, for example, knew that the 
two clinics of the hospital where he worked have a considerable degree of 
Figure 3. An abductive formula where iconic relationships are emphasized
308 S. Paavola
 difference in the mortality of the cases of childbed fever; that so-called street-
births protected from the disease, and that there were time to time cases of the 
disease in rows. There was a sort of “proto-abduction” behind this search; 
Semmelweis knew various curious things related to childbed fever (Q1, Q2, 
Q3, . . .), he believed that if he could find a cause for childbed fever (X), it 
would probably explain at least most of these things, and his conclusion was 
that there possibly is to be found (there must be) such a cause (in relation to 
these curious things); figure 4:
And my point is not just that he used these curious things (Q1, Q2, Q3, . . .) 
as a preliminary test for his hypotheses (like for the crucial hypothesis above). 
He certainly did that also; after figuring out the hypothesis, he could reason 
that it seemed to give an explanation for these curious things: doctors who also 
did autopsies in a nearby mortuary caused most cases of childbed fever (with-
out of course knowing it), and they operated in that clinic of the hospital where 
there were many cases of childbed fever, and for that reason there were time to 
time sickening in rows after doctors’ examinations, and that was also why 
street-births were protected from childbed fever (they happened outside the 
hospital), etc. But what is important from an abductive point of view was that 
before testing, these curious things helped him to restrict in a preliminary (and 
abductive) way the search space for his hypotheses. He was, for example, 
searching for a hypothesis that would operate especially inside the hospital 
(births outside the hospital seemed to lessen the risk), and especially inside that 
clinic where doctors worked. These restrictions were tentative because there 
were cases of childbed fever also outside the hospital, and also in the other 
clinic.
I have used the notion of “similarity” as an essential basis for Semmelweis’ 
abduction. Am I then contradicting myself because I tried to argue in section 1 
that, for iconicity, similarity is not a basic notion but rather characters in them-
selves? Similarity must be somehow defined, and if it is defined then it seems 
to be a question of symbolicity rather than iconicity (see, e.g., Stjernfelt 1999, 
2000: 358)?
Figure 4. A proto-abduction in search for X
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I maintain, however, that both similarity and characters in themselves are 
important for abduction. Semmelweis had to take in account symptoms (i.e., 
characters) in themselves (both concerning symptoms of childbed fever and 
blood poisoning) in order to dissociate from the idea that childbed fever 
and blood poisoning would not have anything in common. If someone had 
 suggested that symptoms of these two diseases have anything in common, 
most doctors at his time, and also Semmelweis before his recognition of this 
similarity, would have said that although there might be some superficial simi-
larities between these two constellations of symptoms, they are totally differ-
ent cases. While he had to take the characters of these symptoms as such (icon-
ically), he had to see their similarity in some respects in order to make the 
abductive move. For abduction, it is enough to see a similarity in some re-
spects in order to draw a hypothesis. And my argument above has been that for 
Semmelweis this hypothesis was promising because he saw that it matched to 
his earlier (tentative) restrictions and clues concerning the cause of childbed 
fever.
4.	 Diagrams	and	distributed	abduction
In the previous section, I aimed at developing the ways of formulating abduc-
tive diagrams from the syllogistic point of view. In this section, I am briefly 
trying to give reasons for something that might look in a very opposite direc-
tion. I mean diagrams and abduction seen from the point of view of distributed 
cognition.
Distributed cognition refers to various approaches that have challenged the 
conception according to which individuals and mental constructions of indi-
viduals’ minds are the center of intelligent activity (see, e.g., Salomon 1993; 
Hutchins 1995). As an alternative to standard problem-solving models, distrib-
uted cognition emphasizes social constructions developed in iterative pro-
cesses by using external representations and features of the environment as an 
essential aid (Pea 1993: 65– 67). For analytical purposes, physically, socially, 
and temporally distributed cognition can be distinguished although in actual 
inquiry processes all these aspects are connected together, and several modes 
and sources of knowledge are interacting with each other. Physically distrib-
uted cognition entails that the inquirers use external objects, features, artifacts, 
and tools to support their intelligent activity. Socially distributed cognition 
means those ways in which social interaction, collaboration, and social prac-
tices support activity. Temporally (and culturally) distributed cognition em-
phasizes the fact that human beings can use representations, tools, methods, 
etc., which are developed in long-term processes (also across generations) as 
an essential help.
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Hoffmann (2011) has emphasized diagrammatic reasoning in general as a 
case of distributed cognition, which means that its function is “to facilitate in-
dividual or social thinking processes in situations that are too complex as to 
being coped with exclusively by internal cognitive means” (Hoffmann 2011). 
Diagrams are important not just because of their iconic character, but also be-
cause they are “objects” (or external representations) that can be perceived and 
observed (see NEM 4: 315, note 1, c. 1906) so that they can be processed not 
just by internal but also external cognitive means.
Peirce was a stern anti-psychologist in relation to logic (MS 498, 499), so 
things related to cognition should not have any consequences when it comes to 
abduction as a form of reasoning. With this Peircean spirit, my aim is not to 
claim that the ideas of distributed cognition have an influence on the logic of 
abduction but to maintain that Peirce’s concepts (especially when developed 
further) give means for conceptualizing processes of distributed cognition. 
Peirce’s basic definition of a sign can already be seen in relation to distributed 
cognition; signs refer to objects (cf. materially distributed cognition) and are 
interpreted in social processes (see Ransdell 2003; Bergman 2004: 40 –80; 
cf. socially distributed cognition). Peirce emphasized, in general, social and 
“future-oriented” aspects of science and logic (e.g., EP 1: 52, 1868; EP 1: 81, 
1869).
Along these lines, Peter Skagestad has developed Peirce’s “semeiotic model 
of mind” according to which the evolution of human beings proceeds espe-
cially by developing external artefacts. Skagestad has referred to Douglas C. 
Engelbart’s views on “augmentationism,” to Karl Popper’s view’s on evolu-
tionary epistemology with external tools and artifacts but also to Peirce’s views 
on signs and knowledge (Skagestad 1993). Peirce sometimes emphasized the 
externality of signs and knowledge:
. . . psychologists undertake to locate various mental powers in the brain; and above all 
consider it as quite certain that the faculty of language resides in a certain lobe; but I 
believe it comes decidedly nearer the truth (though not really true) that language resides 
in the tongue. In my opinion it is much more true that the thoughts of a living writer are 
in any printed copy of his book than that they are in his brain. (CP 7.364, c. 1902; cf. 
also CP 2.54, c. 1902)
Although Peirce’s overall approach to inquiry and human cognition can then 
be interpreted through modern ideas about distributed cognition, his views 
concerning abduction emphasized inferential and/or instinctual aspects 
(Paavola 2005). Distributed cognition in relation to abduction is apparently a 
new interpretation (see Oatley 1996: 135–139; Magnani 2001, Paavola and 
Hakkarainen 2005; Hoffmann 2011). I think that there are good reasons for 
developing abduction like this towards “il lume culturale” (see Bonfantini and 
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Proni 1983: 134; Bonfantini 1988: 1253–1254; cf. Apel 1981: 170 –171) or 
towards “il lume materiale” (Paavola 2007) rather than just as “il lume natu-
rale” (i.e., a guessing instinct as a basis for abduction). One central motivation 
for Peirce to develop abduction was to explain how human beings have so suc-
cessfully and quickly managed to find fertile hypotheses and true theories (CP 
5.591, 1903; EP 2: 217, 1903). Peirce argued that it could not have happened 
by chance because that way would have taken too much time in relation to 
 human history, and he ended up arguing for a guessing instinct (which is by no 
means infallible but still strong enough to have helped inquirers to find suc-
cessful theories and ideas).
I maintain that a central basis for abduction is that human beings are good at 
using various kinds of constraints and clues to help them while searching for 
new ideas. It is beneficial to make an analytic difference between abductive 
instinct and abductive inference although Peirce himself merged these in his 
later writings (Paavola 2005). Besides instinctual or inferential abduction dis-
tributed abduction can be discerned which focuses on those ways things em-
phasized within distributed cognition constrain and guide the search for new 
ideas. Ideas do not turn up from scratch, or just within inquirer’s mind but from 
an interaction with material environment, previously (culturally) developed 
ideas, methods, and theories, and in collaboration with other people, and often 
by developing and modifying these ideas and theories in very long-term pro-
cesses (cf. Hanson 1958: 72, 88). Even when someone (or a group of people) 
is developing something radically new, the elements and ingredients for this 
come from the interaction with the material, social, and cultural environment. 
Human beings create external representations which are then developed and 
modified further by others (see Magnani 2001).
5.	 Conclusion
I have delineated the role of diagrams and iconicity in relation to abductive 
processes of discovery. It is not entirely clear how Peirce meant abduction to 
be taken in relation to diagrammatic reasoning. What is more evident is that 
Peirce wanted to emphasize iconicity within abduction. I think that iconicity is 
a central element of abduction, and I have tried to clarify this connection. In his 
later years, Peirce himself was widening his system of logical graphs, and there 
are indications that they might have encompassed abduction if there had been 
more time for him to develop these graphs. On the other hand, he emphasized 
abduction as a guessing instinct and as a spontaneous conjecture that seemed 
to alienate him from making more specific systems of abduction.
Diagrams are also important because they are a bridge for understanding 
the distributed nature of human cognition. Distributed cognition is especially 
312 S. Paavola
 important in abduction if it is interpreted as a weak form of inference with 
which human beings are in actual situations of puzzlement searching fertile, 
new hypotheses for explaining and interpreting real phenomena. There are 
then various kinds of things that constrain, guide, and help the abductive search 
for new ideas, and all of them should be taken into account if the aim is to 
understand processes of discovery.
Notes
* Thank you for Hal White on help and sharp comments on this paper
1. I thank Petri Mäenpää for bringing this issue up.
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